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Abstract—We ask if it is possible to positively influence social
behavior with no risk of unintentionally incentivizing pathological
behavior. In network routing problems, if network traffic is
composed of many individual agents, it is known that self-
interested behavior among the agents can lead to suboptimal
network congestion. We study situations in which a system
planner charges monetary tolls for the use of network links in
an effort to incentivize efficient routing choices by the users,
but in which the users’ sensitivity to tolls is heterogeneous and
unknown. We seek locally-computed tolls that are guaranteed not
to incentivize worse network routing than in the un-influenced
case. Our main result is to show that if networks are sufficiently
complex and populations sufficiently diverse, perverse incentives
cannot be systematically avoided: any taxation mechanism that
improves outcomes on one network must necessarily degrade
them on another. Nonetheless, for the simple class of parallel
networks, non-perverse taxes do exist; we fully characterize all
such taxation mechanisms, showing that they are a generalized
version of traditional marginal-cost tolls.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern computational and infrastructure systems are be-
coming increasingly interconnected with the social systems
that they serve. Accordingly, engineers must be aware of the
ways in which social behavior affects system performance; this
has spurred recent research on influencing social behavior to
achieve engineering objectives [4]–[6]. Examples of problems
in this context include ridesharing systems [7], transportation
networks [1]–[3], [8], and power grids [9].
In this paper, we study a popular model of traffic congestion
known as “non-atomic congestion games,” in which traffic
needs to be routed across a network from a source node
to a destination node in a way that minimizes the average
delay experienced by the traffic. If a central authority can
control the traffic explicitly, it is typically straightforward to
compute the optimal assignment of traffic; unfortunately, if
the mass of traffic is composed of individual decision-makers,
the aggregate network flows that emerge from individual self-
interested decision-making may be far from optimal. This
inefficiency due to self-interested decisions is termed the price
of anarchy, formally defined as the ratio between the total
congestion of a selfishly-routed flow and that of an optimal
flow, taken in worst case over a class of games [10]. It is
known that even on two-link parallel networks with convex
latency functions, the price of anarchy is unbounded – that is,
selfish flows can be arbitrarily inefficient [11].
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Accordingly, much research has focused on methods of
influencing the routing choices made by individual users as
a means to improve the price of anarchy; one promising set
of methodologies involves charging specially designed tolls
to users of network links in an effort to incentivize more-
efficient network flows [12], [13]. In [14], [15] it is shown
that if a special type of tolling function called a marginal-
cost toll is levied on each network link, that this incentivizes
optimal network routing – provided that all network users
trade off time and money equally. An attractive feature of
marginal-cost tolls is that they can be computed locally
on each network link: a link’s toll depends only on that
link’s congestion characteristics and traffic flow. Thus, the
optimality guaranteed by these tolls is intrinsically robust to
variations or mischaracterizations of network structure. This
local-computation property is known as network agnosticity; in
essence, marginal-cost tolling functions only “know” their own
edge – they are agnostic to global network specifications [4].
The optimality guarantees coupled with the network agnos-
ticity of marginal-cost tolls suggest the appealing possibility
that a system operator could design link prices to incentivize
efficient routing without needing to know the overall structure
of the network. One benefit of an effective network-agnostic
taxation mechanism is that it would be largely robust to
sudden “changes” in network topology such as those caused
by weather events or construction projects.
Unfortunately, it has recently been shown that if the user
population is diverse in price-sensitivity, the optimality guar-
antees of marginal-cost tolls vanish [8]. That is, if some users
value their time more than others, networks exist on which
the routing incentivized by marginal-cost tolls has higher
congestion than un-influenced routing. Furthermore, if the
prices are constrained to be fixed (i.e., constant functions of
link flow rate), every network agnostic taxation mechanism can
create perverse incentives on some parallel network – even
for a homogeneous user population. Whether flow-varying
taxation functions suffer from the same ubiquitous perversity
has remained an open question.
To study this phenomenon rigorously, we formulate a new
robustness metric that we term the perversity index. We define
the perversity index of a taxation mechanism as the ratio be-
tween the total congestion it incentivizes and the un-influenced
congestion, taken in worst case over user populations and
networks. That is, if a taxation mechanism has a perversity
index strictly greater than 1, this indicates that networks exist
on which this mechanism degrades the quality of flows, rather
than improving it. When this is the case, we say that a taxation
mechanism is perverse. We ask the following questions:
1) Do there exist network-agnostic taxation mechanisms
which can improve worst-case congestion on the class of
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2all networks while avoiding causing congestion degra-
dations on each network instance?
2) What are the common characteristics of taxation mech-
anisms which systematically avoid perverse incentives?
In this paper, we first show definitively in Theorem 1 that
if networks are sufficiently complex and the user population
is sufficiently diverse, every network-agnostic taxation mecha-
nism that improves outcomes on some networks must degrade
outcomes on others. That is, every network-agnostic taxation
mechanism is either trivial or perverse. Let PoA (G, T ) and
PI (G, T ) denote the price of anarchy and perversity index (re-
spectively) of class of routing problems G under the influence
of network-agnostic taxation mechanism T , and let PoA (G, ∅)
denote the price of anarchy of uninfluenced problems (these
notations are formally defined later in Section II-B). For
sufficiently-rich G, Theorem 1 states that
PoA (G, T ) < PoA (G, ∅) =⇒ PI (G, T ) > 1. (1)
Since Theorem 1 rules out the possibility of a non-perverse
mechanism for general routing problems, we next turn to a
study of the relationship between PoA and PI on smaller
classes of routing problems. We consider the case of heteroge-
neous populations on the class of parallel-path networks. Here,
we fully characterize the set of all network-agnostic taxation
mechanisms having a perversity index of 1, and show that
they are all a simple variant of classical marginal-cost tolls.
Among these, we also derive tolls which minimize the price of
anarchy, and show that these are equivalent to marginal-cost
tolls which are “tuned” to the most-sensitive users.
Finally, considering the simplified case of homogeneous
populations on general networks, we show in Theorem 5 that
tolls which optimize the price of anarchy are in some sense
maximally perverse. That is, these tolls render the price of
anarchy equal to the perversity index, meaning that under
the influence of these optimal tolls, the problem instances on
which worst-case routing outcomes occur would experience
lower congestion without tolls. We point out that a conse-
quence of this is a simple procedure for minimizing the price
of anarchy subject to an upper bound on perversity.
We expect that the perversity index will provide a rich
framework for studying many different settings in which a
planner desires to positively influence social behavior. While
this paper studies the perversity index for congestion game
pricing problems, such a measure of the risk of unintended
consequences may be of interest to a political organization
which wishes to assure that a proposed policy will not unduly
disenfranchise certain groups.
II. MODEL AND RELATED WORK
A. Routing Game
Consider a network routing problem for a network (V,E)
comprised of vertex set V and edge set E. There is a mass of
traffic r > 0 that needs to be routed from a common source
σ to a common destination t. We write P ⊂ 2E to denote
the set of paths available to traffic, where each path p ∈ P
consists of a set of edges connecting σ to t. A network is
called a parallel network if all paths are disjoint; i.e., for all
paths p, p′ ∈ P , p ∩ p′ = ∅. We write fp ≥ 0 to denote the
mass of traffic using path p. A feasible flow f ∈ R|P| is an
assignment of traffic to various paths such that
∑
p∈P fp = r.
Given a flow f , the flow on edge e is given by fe =∑
p:e∈p fp. To characterize transit delay as a function of traffic
flow, each edge e ∈ E is associated with a specific latency
function `e : [0, r] → [0,∞); `e(fe) denotes the delay
experienced by users of edge e when the edge flow is fe.
We adopt the standard assumptions that each latency function
is nondecreasing, convex, and continuously differentiable. We
measure the cost of a flow f by the total latency, given by
L(f) =
∑
e∈E
fe · `e(fe) =
∑
p∈P
fp · `p(f), (2)
where `p(f) =
∑
e∈p `e(fe) denotes the latency on path p.
We denote the flow that minimizes the total latency by
f∗ ∈ argmin
f is feasible
L(f). (3)
A routing problem is given by G = (V,E, {`e}). We denote
classes of routing problems with the calligraphic G.
To study the effect of taxes on self-interested behavior, we
model the above routing problem as a non-atomic congestion
game. We assign each edge e ∈ E a flow-dependent taxation
function τe : R+ → R. We characterize the taxation sensitiv-
ities of the users with a monotone, nondecreasing function
s : [0, r] → [SL, SU], where each user x ∈ [0, r] has a
taxation sensitivity sx ∈ [SL, SU] ⊆ R+, where SL ≥ 0
and SU ≤ +∞ are lower and upper sensitivity bounds,
respectively. To avoid trivialities, we assume that zero measure
of traffic has sensitivity exactly equal to 0, or that for all  > 0,
s > 0. If all users have the same sensitivity (i.e., sx = sy
for all x ∈ [0, r] and y ∈ [0, r]), the population is said to be
homogeneous; otherwise it is heterogeneous.
Given a flow f , the cost that user x ∈ [0, r] experiences for
using path p ∈ P is of the form
Jx(p; f) =
∑
e∈p
[`e(fe) + sxτe(fe)] . (4)
Thus, for each user x ∈ [0, r], the sensitivity sx can be viewed
as a constant gain on the toll; a user’s experienced cost is then
the sum of the latency and sensitivity-weighted toll. Note that
sensitivity can be interpreted as the reciprocal of an agent’s
value-of-time. We assume that each user selects the lowest-
cost path from the available source-destination paths. We call a
flow f a Nash flow if all users are individually using minimum-
cost paths given the choices of other users. That is, every user
x ∈ [0, r] using path p in f experiences a cost satisfying
Jx(p; f) = min
p˜∈P
Jx (p˜; f) . (5)
It is well-known that a Nash flow exists for any non-atomic
congestion game of the above form [16].
In our analysis, we assume that each sensitivity distribution
function s is unknown to the pricing authority; for a given
routing problem G and SU ≥ SL ≥ 0 we define the set
of possible sensitivity distributions as the set of monotone,
nondecreasing functions SG = {s : [0, r] → [SL, SU]}. We
write s ∈ SG to denote a specific collection of sensitivity
distributions, which we term a population.
3B. Taxation Mechanisms and Performance Metrics
To directly study the importance of knowing network struc-
ture on the effectiveness of taxation mechanisms, we consider
network-agnostic taxation mechanisms as in [8]. Here, each
edge’s taxation function is computed using only locally-
available information. That is, τe(fe) depends only on `e, not
on edge e’s location in the network, the network topology,
the overall traffic rate, or the properties of any other edge.
A network-agnostic taxation mechanism T is thus a mapping
from latency functions to taxation functions, and the taxation
function associated with latency function `e is given by
τe(·) = T (`e). (6)
To evaluate the performance of taxation mechanisms, we
write Lnf(G, s, T ) to denote the total latency of a Nash flow
for routing problem G and population s induced by taxation
mechanism T . Let Lnf(G, ∅) denote the total latency of an
un-influenced Nash flow on G, and let L∗(G) denote the
total latency of the optimal flow on G. The price of anarchy
compares the Nash flows induced by taxes with the optimal
flows in worst case over routing problems and populations.
Formally, the price of anarchy of a class of games G under
the influence of taxes T is defined as
PoA (G, T ) , sup
G∈G
sup
s∈SG
Lnf(G, s, T )
L∗(G) . (7)
In this paper, we pose a somewhat different question: rather
than measuring how far the influenced flows are from optimal,
it may be desirable to quantify the risk of causing harm to
congestion with respect to the un-influenced flows. This can
be easily captured with a natural modification of the price of
anarchy concept by replacing the optimal total latency with the
un-influenced total latency Lnf(G, ∅). We call such a metric
the index of perversity of taxation mechanism T , defined as
PI (G, T ) , sup
G∈G
sup
s∈SG
Lnf(G, s, T )
Lnf(G, ∅) . (8)
Here, if T has a large index of perversity, this means that
on some networks, it incentivizes flows that are considerably
worse than the un-influenced flows; in other words, it can
create perverse incentives. If a taxation mechanism has a
perversity index of 1, we say that it is non-perverse; otherwise,
it is perverse. Note that it is always true that PI(G, T ) ≤
PoA(G, T ); this is because on any G, Lnf(G, ∅) ≥ L∗(G).
Finally, when these metrics are evaluated only over homoge-
neous populations (as opposed to heterogeneous), we write
them as PoAhm(G, T ) and PIhm(G, T ), respectively.
C. Related Work
The following is a brief survey of relevant work on the ro-
bustness and perversity of taxation mechanisms in congestion
games. Much work focuses on network-dependent taxation
mechanisms, in which each edge toll is a function of the
entire routing problem. Network dependency allows taxation
mechanisms to incentivize precisely-targeted network flows,
as with fixed tolls, which for any e ∈ G, τe(fe) = qe
for some qe ≥ 0. If network structure, traffic-rate, and user
sensitivity specifications are known precisely, it is possible
to compute fixed tolls which induce optimal Nash flows on
any network [12], [13]. However, if any of these pieces of
information are unknown, no fixed tolls exist which guarantee
optimal routing, and the perversity index of fixed tolls is
typically greater than 1 [8]. Network-dependent tolls have
been studied subject to many restrictions: bounded, budget-
balanced, and dynamic schemes have been proposed [17]–[20].
However, the robustness of most of these schemes to variations
of user sensitivity has not been investigated explicitly, and the
perversity index in these contexts is generally unknown.
The classical example of a network-agnostic taxation mech-
anism is that of the marginal-cost or Pigovian taxation mech-
anism Tmc. For any edge e with latency function `e, the
accompanying marginal-cost toll is
τmce (fe) = fe · `′e(fe), ∀fe ≥ 0, (9)
where `′ represents the flow derivative of `. It has long been
known that for any G, it is true that L∗(G) = Lnf (G, s, Tmc) ,
provided that all users have a sensitivity equal to 1 [14]. That
is, for unit-sensitivity homogeneous users, we have a perfect
perversity index PI (G, Tmc) = PoA (G, Tmc) = 1.
Recent research has identified several new network-agnostic
taxation mechanisms, which are all in some sense generaliza-
tions of Tmc: in restricted settings, scaled marginal-cost tolls
can be non-perverse [21] while guaranteeing improvements;
furthermore, there exists a universal taxation mechanism based
on Tmc which optimizes routing using large tolls [4]. Dynamic
network-agnostic tolls converging to Tmc are studied in [22].
In the present paper, Theorem 2 shows that this connection to
Tmc is no accident; in a sense, the only interesting network-
agnostic taxation mechanisms are generalizations of Tmc.
Our work here is also tightly connected with the broader
theme of “biased” congestion games [23], where players mis-
interpret edge cost functions in some systematic way. Several
works have investigated the price of anarchy under various
payoff biases such as altruism [24] and pessimism [23].
Analogous to our definition of the perversity index, the authors
of [25] study the “price of risk aversion,” which measures
how society’s risk preferences affect aggregate congestion as
compared to ordinary Nash flows. Similarly, [26] studies the
“deviation ratio,” which measures essentially the same quantity
for arbitrary cost function biases.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
Our first question is this: do there exist network-agnostic
taxation mechanisms which have a perversity index of 1?
Example 1 shows that at least the marginal-cost taxation
mechanism (9) has a perversity index strictly greater than
1; subsequently, Theorem 1 shows that this is true for any
network-agnostic taxation mechanism.
Example 1. Consider the network depicted in Figure 1,
consisting of the well-known Braess’s Paradox network [27]
in parallel with a single constant-latency edge. Let marginal-
cost tolls be charged on the network according to (9); that
is, edges e1 and e4 are each charged a flow-varying toll of
τe(fe) = fe. If the user population has 2 units of traffic and a
homogeneous toll sensitivity of s ∈ [0, 1], the unique Nash flow
4Fig. 1. Example 1: A network demonstrating that marginal-cost tolls are
perverse on single-source/destination networks. The user population has mass
r = 2, divided equally between sensitivity types with s = 0 and s = 1.
Here, when no tolls are levied, the unique Nash flow for any population is
depicted on the left, under the caption “Uninfluenced/Optimal”; this flow has
a total latency of 4. However, for the depicted heterogeneous population,
marginal-cost tolls induce the Nash flow shown on the right under caption
”Marginal-cost Tolls,” with an increased total latency of 5.
on this network is the one labeled “Uninfluenced/Optimal” in
Figure 1. Since all agents are experiencing a cost of 2 + s,
deviating to the zig-zag path or to e6 would yield a larger cost
of 2 + 2s or 3, respectively. Since there are 2 units of traffic
experiencing a delay of 2 each, the total latency is 4.
Now consider a heterogeneous population in which 1 unit
of traffic has a sensitivity of s1 = 0 (the orange traffic in
Figure 1), and 1 unit of traffic has a sensitivity of s2 = 1.
In this case, a new Nash flow emerges: one in which all the
insensitive traffic uses the zig-zag path, and all the sensitive
traffic uses the constant-latency link, labeled “Marginal-cost
Tolls” in Figure 1. In this flow, any agent on the zig-zag path
has a delay of 2, but any agent on the constant-latency path
has a delay of 3, for a total latency of 2 + 3 = 5, which is
considerably greater than the un-tolled total latency of 4.
Note here that we have s1 = 0 for ease of exposition, but
similar results can be obtained for any small positive value
for s1, as we show explicitly in the proof of Theorem 1.
A. Perverse incentives are unavoidable if networks are suffi-
ciently complex
Our first theorem shows that the pathology shown in Exam-
ple 1 is not merely a vestige of the particular form of marginal-
cost tolls; indeed, all network-agnostic taxation mechanisms
can create perverse incentives if the class of networks is rich
enough.
Theorem 1. Let G denote the class of all routing problems,
and let SU > SL = 01. If a network-agnostic taxation
1 Note that SL = 0 is being used in conjunction with the assumption that
all traffic has positive sensitivity. The proof of Theorem 1 is completed with
all traffic having a strictly positive sensitivity s1, and SL = 0 simply ensures
that the traffic’s sensitivity is not bounded away from zero.
mechanism improves the price of anarchy, then it creates
perverse incentives. That is,
PoA (G, T ) < PoA (G, ∅) =⇒ PI (G, T ) > 1. (10)
A cornerstone of the proof of Theorem 1 is the following
lemma, which gives a set of necessary conditions for a
network-agnostic taxation mechanism to be non-perverse. The
key insight from Lemma 1.1 is that the only candidate for a
non-perverse mechanism is a generalized form of marginal-
cost tolls. Throughout this paper, we write T (κ1, κ2) for
κ1, κ2 ∈ R to denote a taxation mechanism which assigns
tolls of
τe(fe) = κ1`e(fe) + κ2fe`
′
e(fe). (11)
Lemma 1.1. Let G denote the class of all routing problems.
If network-agnostic taxation mechanism T has PI (G, T ) =
1, then it is a generalized marginal-cost taxation mechanism,
written T gmc, which is T (κ1, κ2) as in (11) with κ1 > −1/SU,
κ2 ≥ 0, and κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/SU.
The proof of Lemma 1.1 appears in the Appendix.
Before continuing, note that the feasible toll-coefficient
region specified in Lemma 1.1 does allow negative tolls; in
particular, κ2 = 0 and κ1 = −1/(2SU) is always feasible and
thus non-perverse. This can be interpreted as paying users a
subsidy proportional to the delay on each edge. However, note
that any tolls with κ2 = 0 are trivial; that is, since they are
proportional to delay, they effectively merely scale all delay
functions by a constant factor and thus incentivize exactly the
un-influenced Nash flows. Later, Corollary 4 demonstrates that
the price of anarchy is minimized by maximizing κ1 and κ2,
thus typically rendering them positive.
The space of network-agnostic taxation mechanisms is quite
large, but Lemma 1.1 dramatically reduces the search, allowing
us to search over just two parameters, κ1 and κ2.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 1.1 rules out all taxation mechanisms other than
T (κ1, κ2) with κ1 > −1/SU, and κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/SU.
First, if κ2 = 0, this taxation mechanism assigns taxes of
τe(fe) = κ1`e(fe) to each edge. When κ1 > −1/SU, the
edge cost functions induced are simply equal to scaled latency
functions, meaning that the taxes induce only the uninfluenced
Nash flows. That is, these taxes are trivial: κ2 = 0 yields
Lnf(G, s, T (κ1, 0)) = Lnf(G, ∅) for every network G and
population s. For tolls to improve the price of anarchy as
in (10), they must modify some flow on some network; the
argument above shows that this requires κ2 > 0. Thus, for the
remainder of the proof, we assume that κ2 > 0.
Our task is to create a user population s (that is, a
distribution of tax-sensitivities) and a network G such that
Lnf(G, s, T (κ1, κ2)) > Lnf(G, ∅). We will do this with a
population having two sensitivity values s2 > s1 > 0 and a
network resembling that in Figure 1. Construct the population
as follows: let a unit mass of users have sensitivity s1 (which
we will specify momentarily) and a unit mass have s2 = SU,
for a total of 2 units of traffic. Levy tolls of T (κ1, κ2) on
the network with κ1 > −1/SU and κ2 > 0. Define γ2 ,
s2κ2
1+s2κ1
∈ (0, 1], and choose s1 so that γ1 , s1κ21+s1κ1 = γ2/8.
5Then an agent with sensitivity si ∈ {s1, s2} experiences an
effective cost function on edge e of
Je(fe) = `e(fe) + γife`
′
e(fe). (12)
Now, let G be the network depicted in Figure 1; let
`e1(fe1) = fe1 , let `e4(fe4) = fe4 , let `e2(fe2) = `e3(fe3) =
1 + γ2/8, let `e5(fe5) = 0, and let `e6 (fe6) = 2 + γ2.
Enumerate the paths as follows: denote the “zig-zag” path
p1 = {e1, e5, e4}, the remaining two paths in the upper sub-
network p2 = {e1, e3} and p3 = {e2, e4}, and the isolated
constant-latency path p4 = {e6}; and denote the path flow of
pi by fi. We will refer to paths p1, p2, and p3 in the upper
subnetwork as the “Braess subnetwork.”
On this network, the flow (depicted on the right in Figure 1)
fperverse , (1, 0, 0, 1) is a Nash flow for this population
with all of population 1 choosing the zig-zag path and all of
population 2 choosing path 4. This is because for population
i ∈ {1, 2}, the effective cost of the four paths under fperverse
are 2(1 + γi), (2 + γ1 + γi), (2 + γ1 + γi), and (2 + γ2),
respectively. Since γ1 = γ2/8, this means that under fperverse,
population 1 weakly prefers p1, and population 2 strictly
prefers p4. This flow has total latency Lnf(G, s, T ) = 4 + γ2.
However, it can be verified that if tolls are removed, the
unique Nash flow is fnf , (γ2/4, 1−γ2/8, 1−γ2/8, 0), which
has a total latency of Lnf(G, ∅) = 4 + γ2/2, or
Lnf(G, s, T ) > Lnf (G, ∅) (13)
and the considered tolls are perverse.
B. Parallel networks prevent perverse incentives
Theorem 1 and its proof show that it does not take much
complexity to render a network-agnostic taxation mechanism
perverse. Does this mean that it is never possible to achieve a
perversity index of 1 on any class of networks? Fortunately,
the answer is no – and our Theorem 2 shows that on parallel
networks, the necessary condition from Lemma 1.1 is also
sufficient to achieve a perversity index of 1. Thus, Theorem 2
gives a full characterization of non-perverse taxation mecha-
nisms for parallel networks.
Theorem 2. Let Gp denote the class of routing problems with
parallel networks. For any SU ≥ SL ≥ 0, a network-agnostic
taxation mechanism T has unity perversity index on Gp, i.e.,
PI (Gp, T ) = 1, (14)
if and only if it is T gmc, assigning the tolling functions
τe(fe) = κ1`e(fe) + κ2fe`
′
e(fe), (15)
with κ1 > −1/SU, κ2 ≥ 0, and κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/SU.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the Appendix.
Note that if κ1 = 0, then for any κ2 ≥ 0, the above
corresponds to simple scaled marginal-cost tolls. In this case,
the coefficient constraints reduce to κ2 ∈ [0, 1/SU]; that
is, Theorem 2 states that scaled marginal-cost taxes have a
perversity of 1 if and only if they are scaled conservatively, i.e.,
they are no larger than would be required to induce optimal
flows for a homogeneous population of high sensitivity SU.
Furthermore, note that all of the results in this paper
which are stated for parallel networks also hold for networks
composed of several parallel networks in series.
C. The price of anarchy of non-perverse tolls
Having shown that parallel networks do admit non-perverse
taxation mechanisms, we now ask how effective those mecha-
nisms are in reducing worst-case congestion. Simply because
taxes have a perversity index of 1 does not immediately imply
that their associated PoA is small; nonetheless, we show that
generalized marginal-cost tolls can provide modest reductions
of worst-case congestion.
Theorem 3. Let Gpd denote the class of all parallel networks
with polynomial latency functions of degree at most d ≥ 1.
For any SU ≥ SL ≥ 0, levy the generalized marginal-cost
taxation mechanism T gmc as defined in (15) with coefficients
κ1 ≥ −1/SU, κ2 ≥ 0, and κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/SU. Let βκ1,κ2 ,
κ2SL
1+κ1SL
∈ [0, 1]. Then the price of anarchy associated with
these tolls is
PoA (Gpd , T gmc) =
1
1 + dβκ1,κ2 − d
(
1+dβκ1,κ2
1+d
) d+1
d
. (16)
We provide a new proof of Theorem 3 in the Appendix
that relies on our arguments for Theorem 2, but note that
it is also a consequence of [24, Theorem 7.1], which gives
the price of anarchy associated with heterogeneous, partially-
altruistic populations. Though the two proofs are substantially
different, they share the high-level idea that on parallel net-
works, increasing the fraction of players that are merely delay-
averse always leads to worse congestion. This implies (in our
model) that the price of anarchy is realized by a homogeneous
population with sensitivity equal to SL, and the expression
in (16) due to [23] applies immediately.
Furthermore, this yields the following simple characteriza-
tion of the PoA-minimizing coefficients κ1 and κ2. Before
stating the result, we point out that worst-case performance
guarantees provided by a taxation mechanism can often be im-
proved by increasing all edge tolls appropriately (see detailed
discussion in [4]). In order to make meaningful statements
about congestion-minimizing tolls, it is useful to parameterize
tolls by a stylized upper-bound; the parameter M > 0 plays
this role in the following result. Thus, Corollary 4 solves the
following optimization problem:
(κ∗1, κ
∗
2) ∈ arg inf
κ1,κ2≤M
PoA (Gpd , T gmc) . (17)
Corollary 4. For any d ≥ 1 and taxation coefficient upper
bound M > 0, the price of anarchy in (17) due to bounded
T gmc is minimized by setting κ∗2 = M and κ
∗
1 = M − 1/SU.
If SU = +∞, then this simplifies to κ∗1 = κ∗2 = M .
Proof. The PoA expression in (16) is decreasing in βκ1,κ2 ,
which for any SL, SU and fixed M is maximized by saturating
the bounds κ1 ≥ κ2 − 1/SU and κ2 ≤M .
The price of anarchy due to tolls as in Corollary 4 is plotted
for several values of d in Figure 2. Note that even when d is
6Fig. 2. The optimal price of anarchy achievable using non-perverse network-
agnostic tolls, where d indicates the largest degree of polynomial allowed in
the considered latency functions. These values are plotted using the machinery
of Theorem 3. The PoA is plotted with respect to SL/SU, which can serve
as a proxy for the variance of the price sensitivities in the user population.
On the far left, the price of anarchy resolves to the un-tolled value; on the
right, the price of anarchy is 1. Our result continuously bridges the space in
between.
unbounded (the dotted red curve in Figure 2), the price of
anarchy is bounded whenever SL/SU > 0.
In the special case of SU = +∞ (that is, no upper bound
on sensitivity is known), the PoA-minimizing coefficients in
Corollary 4 reduce to κ1 = κ2 = M . Note that this is iden-
tically the universal taxation mechanism from [4], which was
developed to serve an entirely different purpose of optimizing
the price of anarchy in the large-M limit.
IV. OPTIMALITY MAXIMIZES PERVERSITY
In this section we initiate a study on the tradeoff between
optimizing for the perversity index and optimizing for the PoA,
and show that the choice of coefficients for T (κ1, κ2) which
minimize the price of anarchy for homogeneous populations
on general networks necessarily has a perversity index equal to
the price of anarchy. That is, minimizing the price of anarchy
leads to maximizing the perversity index.
Theorem 5. Let Gd denote the class of all networks with
polynomial latency functions of degree at most d ≥ 1. For
homogeneous populations, for any 0 ≤ SL < SU and taxation
coefficient upper bound M , the PoA-minimizing toll scalars
(κ∗1, κ
∗
2) , arg inf
κ1,κ2≤M
PoAhm (Gd, T (κ1, κ2)) (18)
satisfy the following:
PoAhm (Gd, T (κ∗1, κ∗2)) = PIhm (Gd, T (κ∗1, κ∗2)) > 1. (19)
That is, the tolls which minimize the price of anarchy render
the perversity index exactly equal to the price of anarchy –
which necessarily must be greater than 1 (see [4]). The proof
of Theorem 5 appears in the Appendix.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper represents an initial step towards understand-
ing the possible negative consequences of influencing social
behavior in network routing situations. Note that this paper
largely considers only network-agnostic taxation mechanisms,
but that in practice many social planners would have access to
more information. Future work will focus on this closely and
attempt to understand how obtaining information regarding the
structure of the network can help reduce the risk of unintended
consequences.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1.1: We shall exhibit example networks on
which various tolls are perverse, thus eliminating all but tolls
of the form in (15). Note that the entire proof of Lemma 1.1 is
completed for homogeneous user populations; this is because
non-perversity for homogeneous populations is a necessary
condition for non-perversity for heterogeneous populations.
First, consider the network in Figure 3(a).
This network has two paths in parallel; the first path is a
pair of edges in series with arbitrary latency functions `1 and
`2, the second path consists of a single edge with latency
function `3 satisfying `1 + `2 = `3. For any such network,
any nominal Nash flow fnf is optimal; thus, a non-perverse
taxation mechanism T would need to incentivize a flow fT
that satisfies fT = fnf = fopt = (r/2, r/2) by charging tolls
satisfying τ1(r/2)+τ2(r/2) = τ3(r/2). That is, T is additive,
or T (`1) + T (`2) = T (`1 + `2). Note that this also implies
that T (0) = 0, since any function `1 can be written `1 + 0.
Next we show that T (`) is constant when ` is constant.
Consider the network in Figure 3(a) when `1(f1) = `3(f3) =
b > 0 and `2(f2) =  > 0. It is clear that the unique Nash
and optimal flows both route all traffic on the lower path; i.e.,
for all r > 0, fnf3 = f
opt
3 = r and f
nf
1 = f
opt
1 = 0. Writing
T (b)(·) as the tolling function assigned to `1(f1) = b by T ,
it follows that b+ T (b)(r) ≤ b+ + T (b)(0) + T ()(0), or
T (b)(r)− T (b)(0) ≤ + T ()(0). (20)
Requiring that the map x 7→ T (x)(0) is Lebesgue-measurable,
we obtain that it must be continuous. Recall that T (0)(f) = 0,
so taking (20) in the limit as  → 0 we obtain that for all r
and b, T (b)(r) − T (b)(0) ≤ 0, or T (b)(·) is nonincreasing
in flow. An opposite argument shows that T (b)(·) must be a
nondecreasing (and thus constant) function of flow. Because T
is a continuous mapping from R to R for constant latency func-
tions, its additivity implies linearity: T (b)(f) = κ1b. Finally,
for all  > 0, it must always be true for any possible agent
sensitivities s ∈ [SL, SU] that (1 + κ1s)b < (1 + κ1s)(b+ ),
or that κ1 > −1/SU.
Next, we show that degree-d monomial latency functions
must be assigned degree-d tolling functions. The network in
Figure 3(b) has two edges in parallel with latency functions
`1(f1) = α(f1)
d and `2(f2) = λα(f2)d, where α > 0, λ > 0,
and d ≥ 1. For any such network, the unique un-influenced
Nash flow is optimal; thus, a non-perverse T would need to
induce a flow fT that satisfies fT = fnf = fopt. It can be
shown that for any r > 0, this flow is
fT1 =
(λα)1/dr
(α)1/d + (λα)1/d
, fT2 =
(α)1/dr
(α)1/d + (λα)1/d
.
Fig. 3. Example networks used to prove Lemma 2.1.
Since fT is a nominal Nash flow, `1(fT1 ) = `2(f
T
2 ); and f
T =
fopt implies that τ1(fT1 ) = τ2(f
T
2 ). In the following, let r =
(α)1/d+(λα)1/d, so for all α, λ, τ1
(
(λα)1/d
)
= τ2
(
(α)1/d
)
.
First let λ = 2, so that `2(f2) = 2`1(f2). Then additivity
ensures that τ2(f2) = 2τ1(f2). That is, τ1
(
(2α)1/d
)
=
2τ1
(
(α)1/d
)
. Since this must hold for any α, it implies either
that T (αfd)(f) ≡ 0, or that T (αfd)(f) = ηαfd for some
ηα > 0 which depends on α.
To characterize ηα, we substitute fT into τ1(fT1 ) = τ2(f
T
2 )
and solve, yielding ηαλ = ηλα. That is, ηα = Kα for some
K ≥ 0, so T (αfd)(f) = Kα(f)d for some K ≥ 0. Note that
K may depend on d.
To find K, consider Figure 3(c). This network has `1(f1) =
α(f1)
d in parallel with a constant latency function `2(f2) = 1.
Here, if r ≤ (1/(α(d + 1)))1/d, the uninfluenced Nash and
optimal flow on this network is (r, 0). Thus, τ1(f) must be
small enough that it does not incentivize any user to use edge
2 when r is low. Precisely, keeping in mind that τ1(f1) =
Kα(f1)
d, we require that for all sensitivities s ∈ [SL, SU],
α(f1)
d+sKα(f1)
d ≤ 1+sκ1, or, substituting the appropriate
f1, that
α(1 + sK)
((
1
α(d+ 1)
)1/d)d
≤ 1 + sκ1. (21)
This implies that sK ≤ sκ1d+sκ1+d. This simplifies nicely
if we write K = κ1 + κ2d (where κ2 ∈ R), in which case
it follows that κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/s for all d and s, or that κ2 ≤
κ1+1/SU. Writing τ1(f1) in terms of κ1 and κ2 gives the nice
decomposition in terms of latency function `1 and marginal-
cost function f1 · `′1:
τ1(f1) = κ1`1(f1) + κ2f1 · `′1(f1).
Finally, consider the network in Figure 3(d). This network
has some arbitrary admissible latency function `1 on edge 1
and a latency function `2(f2) = β(f2)d on edge 2. We will
choose `2 such that the optimal and Nash flows coincide on
this network for some r > 1 when f2 = 1.
First, assume that `1(0) = 0. Let β = `1(f1) and d =
f1`
′
1(f1)/`1(f1) ≥ 1. Then `1(f1) = `2(1) and f1`′1(f1) =
`′2(1); i.e., both the latencies and the marginal costs of the
edges are equal, which means that (f1, 1) is both a Nash and
an optimal flow. Since `2 is a monomial, we can write its
tolling function as τ2(f2) = κ1β(f2)d + κ2dβ(f2)d, where
κ2 ≤ κ1 + 1/SU. Using this, we can simply derive the first-
link tolling function T (`1)(f1) using the following:
`1(f1) + sT (`1)(f1) = β(f2)
d + s (κ1β + κ2dβ) (f2)
d.
8Substituting the definitions of β and d and canceling similar
terms, we obtain that T (`1) satisfies (15) as desired.
Finally, if `1(0) > 0, define ˜`1(f1) , `1(f1) − `1(0),
and let `2(f2) = β(f2)d + `1(0) with β = ˜`1(f1) and
d = f1`
′
1(f1)/
˜`
1(f1) ≥ 1; then the additivity of T ensures
that T (`1) = T (˜`1) + κ1(`1(0)) and T (`2) = T (β(f2)d) +
κ1(`1(0)), and the proof proceeds as above.
Proofs for Theorem 2
Next, Lemma 2.1 shows that Nash flows on parallel net-
works behave very nicely under the influence of T gmc. Specif-
ically, Lemma 2.1 proves that the worst-case total latency on
a parallel network with T gmc is realized by a low-sensitivity
homogeneous population.
Lemma 2.1. Let sL denote a homogeneous population in
which every user has sensitivity SL ≥ 0, and denote by T gmc
a taxation mechanism satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1.1.
For any parallel network G ∈ Gp and heterogeneous popula-
tion s in which every user has a sensitivity no less than SL,
Lnf (G, sL, T gmc) ≥ Lnf (G, s, T gmc) . (22)
Proof. For every user x, T gmc induces cost functions of the
form Jxe (fe) = (1 + sxκ1)`e(fe) + sxκ2fe`
′
e(fe). (23)
Since we can scale these costs functions by any user-specific
positive scalar without changing the underlying Nash flows,
these cost functions are equivalent to the following:
Jxe (fe) = `e(fe) +
sxκ2
1 + sxκ1
fe`
′
e(fe). (24)
Given the conditions κ2 ≥ 0 and κ1 ≥ κ2 − 1/SU, the
expression sxκ21+sxκ1 ∈ [0, 1] and is monotone increasing in sx.
Thus, analysis can be simplified with abuse of notation by
assuming that cost functions are simply given by the following:
Jxe (fe) = `e(fe) + sxfe`
′
e(fe), (25)
where sx ∈ [0, 1] can be viewed as a synthetic sensitivity.
For convenience, we write `∗e(fe) , fe`′e(fe). When de-
scribing the cost experienced by a particular agent whose
sensitivity is s ∈ [0, 1], we write
`se(fe) , `e(fe) + s`∗e(fe), (26)
and we write `mce (fe) , `1e(fe) to denote the marginal-
cost function associated with edge e. The following claim
gives important information about the structure of Nash flows
induced by T gmc.
Claim 2.2. If fnf is a Nash flow on G ∈ Gp for population s
under the influence of T gmc, let pi and pj be any two paths for
which fnfi > 0 and f
nf
j > 0, and with some user x selecting
pi and user y selecting pj . Then if sx ≤ sy , we have the
following:
1) `i(fnfi ) ≤ `j(fnfj ),
2) `mci (f
nf
i ) ≥ `mcj (fnfj ).
Proof. Let fnf be a Nash flow and let pi and pj be paths such
that fnfi > 0 and f
nf
j > 0. Because this is a Nash flow, any
agent y using path pj experiences a (weakly) lower cost than
she would on path pi, or
`i(fi) + sy`
∗
i (fi) ≥ `j(fj) + sy`∗j (fj). (27)
That is,
sy
(
`∗i (fi)− `∗j (fj)
) ≥ `j(fj)− `i(fi). (28)
In the same Nash flow, consider some user x using path pi.
For this user, a similar argument shows that
sx
(
`∗i (fi)− `∗j (fj)
) ≤ `j(fj)− `i(fi). (29)
Combining (28) and (29) yields
0 ≤ (sy − sx)
(
`∗i (fi)− `∗j (fj)
)
, (30)
meaning that sy ≥ sx is equivalent to `∗i (fi) ≥ `∗j (fj); in-
equalities (28) and (29) further imply `i(fi) ≤ `j(fj), proving
item (1). That is, in every Nash equilibrium, lower-sensitivity
users pay higher tolls and experience lower latency2.
Henceforth, we index the paths such that `∗i (f
nf
i ) ≥
`∗i+1(f
nf
i+1). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, if `∗i (fnfi ) >
`∗i+1(f
nf
i+1), we define si as the number satisfying
`i(fi) + si`
∗
i (fi) = `i+1(fi+1) + si`
∗
i+1(fi+1). (31)
When `∗i (f
nf
i ) = `
∗
i+1(f
nf
i+1), let si = si−1 (or 0 if i =
1). Then a user with sensitivity si (weakly) prefers path
i in fnf ; thus, each si ≤ si+1. Finally, it follows from
`∗i (fi) ≥ `∗i+1(fi+1) and (31) that for any si < 1, we
have `i(fi) + `∗i (fi) ≥ `i+1(fi+1) + `∗i+1(fi+1), proving
item (2).
The basic proof approach is to exploit this ordering of
marginal costs, and show that reducing agents’ sensitivities
(thereby making the population “more homogeneous”) shifts
agents from low marginal-cost paths to high marginal-cost
paths, increasing the total latency. Formally, we define a
mapping Σ : [0, 1] × S → S. For any starting population s0
and any α, we will define Σ
(
α; s0
)
as a right-shift of s0 by α
units. The sensitivity of user x in population Σ(α, s0) is given
by
Σ(α, s0)x =
{
s0(0) if x ≤ α
s0(x− α) if x > α. (32)
Because s is defined to be an increasing function, this is
equivalent to converting a mass of α of the most-sensitive
users to a mass α of the least-sensitive users.
Claim 2.2 allows us to assume without loss of generality that
any user population s has a finite number of sensitivity types;
to see this, simply note that if users with distinct sensitivities
are using the same path in a Nash flow, one sensitivity may
be exchanged for the other without perturbing either agent’s
preferences. To be precise, given a Nash flow fnf , (indexing
the paths so that `i(fnfi ) ≤ `i+1(fnfi+1)), we will assume for
each path pi ∈ P \ p1, each user has the minimally-indifferent
sensitivity si described in (31) in the proof of Claim 2.2.
For notational brevity, we will typically write fnf(α) to
represent a Nash flow associated with population Σ(α; s0).
Our central goal will be to characterize the effect of marginal
increases in α on the Nash flow. We express this marginal
effect as ∂∂αf
nf(α).
The following definition will be helpful in the proof:
2 In the language of [28], in our setting, every Nash flow is canonical.
9Definition 1. In a Nash flow fnf , paths pi and pj with i < j
are said to be strategically coupled if si satisfies `sii (f
nf
i ) =
`sij (f
nf
j ). That is, agents on the lower-index path are indifferent
between the two paths. We write Pi(fnf) to denote the set of
paths that are strategically coupled to path pi in fnf .3
First, we show that the primary effect of an increase in α
is to shift traffic from Pn to P1.
Claim 2.3. For every path pi ∈ P1, ∂∂αfnfi (α) ≥ 0. For every
path pj ∈ Pn, ∂∂αfnfj (α) ≤ 0.
Proof. Let s1 denote the sensitivity of agents using p1 in fnf .
Increasing α changes the sensitivity of a small fraction of high-
sensitivity users to s1. By Definition 1 and Claim 2.2, these
users strictly prefer the paths in P1 to any other paths, so a
marginal increase in α induces a marginal increase in flow on
P1. That is, at least one path in pi ∈ P1 has ∂∂αfnfi (α) >
0. An implication of Claim 2.2 is that all paths in P1 have
strictly flow-varying cost functions, so an increase on flow on
pi induces an increase in flow on all paths in P1, proving the
first statement.
Next, let sn denote the sensitivity of agents using pn in fnf ;
Definition 1 and Claim 2.2 shows that these agents weakly
prefer Pn. Increasing α shifts some of these users to P1,
so at least one path in pi ∈ Pn has ∂∂αfnfi (α) < 0. If Pn
contains a path with a constant latency function, then this is
the path which the flow leaves; otherwise, the flow would
deviate to a non-Nash flow. On the other hand, if all paths in
Pn are strictly flow-varying, then every path flow in Pn must
decrease, proving the second statement.
Claim 2.4. For any α, if pj /∈ P1(α) and pj /∈ Pn(α), it
holds that ∂∂αf
nf
j (α) = 0. That is, γ :=
∑
i∈P1
∂
∂αf
nf
i (α) =
−∑i∈Pn ∂∂αfnfi (α).
Proof. First, let pi be the lowest-index path such that pi /∈ P1
(that is, pi−1 ∈ P1). Definition 1 means that for any pj ∈ P1,
`
sj
j (fj) < `
sj
i (fi). Since the inequality is strict, the fact from
Claim 2.3 that ∂∂αf
nf
j (α) ≥ 0 means that marginally no agent
on P1 will switch to pi.
However, since fnf(α) is a Nash flow, it is true that
`sij (fj) ≥ `sii (fi). Here, ∂∂αfnfj (α) ≥ 0 implies that `sij (fj)
can only increase, so no agent on pi will be incentivized to
switch to any path in P1. Thus, the flow on pi is not influenced
by the changes in flow on any lower-index path; if its flow
changes, the influence must come from a higher-index path.
Now, let pi be the highest-index path such that pi /∈ Pn
(that is, pi+1 ∈ Pn). Definition 1 means that for any pj ∈ Pn,
`sii (fi) < `
si
j (fj). Since the inequality is strict, the fact that
∂
∂αf
nf
j (α) ≤ 0 means that (marginally) no agent on pi will
be incentivized to switch to any path in Pn. However, since
fnf(α) is a Nash flow, it is true that `sjj (fj) ≤ `sji (fi). Here,
∂
∂αf
nf
j (α) ≤ 0 implies that `sjj (fj) can only decrease, so no
agent on any path in Pn will be incentivized to switch to pi.
Thus, the flow on pi is not influenced by the changes in flow
on any higher-index path.
3When clear from context, we write Pi(fnf) simply as Pi.
This argument may then be repeated with all remaining
paths that are not in P1 or Pn to show that the only path
flows that may change in response to α are those in P1 and
Pn, obtaining the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: We can now quantify the effect of
an increase in α on total latency. By definition, a marginal
increase in α corresponds to changing the sensitivity of the
highest-sensitivity user to that of the lowest-sensitivity user.
The Nash flow has been represented in such a way that this in
turn causes that user to strictly prefer P1 and thus switch from
Pn to P1. In the following, ∇fŁ(f) represents the gradient
vector of Ł with respect to flow f given by {`mcp }p∈P , which
by Claim 2.2 is ordered descending. Let pj be the highest-
index path in P1, and pk be the lowest-index path in Pn.
∂
∂α
Ł
(
fnf(α)
)
= ∇fŁ
(
fnf(α)
) · ∂
∂α
fnf(α)
=
∑
i∈P1∪Pn
`mci
(
fnfi (α)
) ∂
∂α
fnfi (α)
≥ γ [`mcj (fnfj (α))− `mck (fnfk (α))] ≥ 0.
Here, the last line is a consequence of Claims 2.3 and 2.4:
since pj is defined as a member of P1, we have that
∂
∂αf
nf
j (α) ≥ 0, and since pk is defined as a member of Pn,
we have that ∂∂αf
nf
k (α) ≤ 0; the last inequality then follows
from the ordering of marginal costs as in Claim 2.2.
Since at every Nash flow fnf(α) it is true that
∂
∂αŁ
(
fnf(α)
) ≥ 0, the definition of Σ (α, s0) implies that
for any initial sensitivity distribution s0,
L (fnf (Σ (1, s0))) ≥ L (fnf (Σ (0, s0))) , (33)
or that Lnf (G, sL, T gmc) ≥ Lnf (G, s, T gmc) .
Proof of Theorem 2: Let G ∈ Gp be a parallel network, s
be any arbitrary sensitivity distribution, sL be a homogeneous
population in which all users have sensitivity SL, and let
taxation mechanism T gmc satisfy (15). Lemma 2.1 ensures
Lnf (G, sL, T gmc) ≥ Lnf (G, s, T gmc) . (34)
Let s0 denote a totally-insensitive homogeneous population;
that is, all agents have sensitivity 0. Note that s0 is itself a low-
sensitivity homogeneous population and that s is a population
in which all users have sensitivity no less than 0; thus, we
may simply apply Lemma 2.1 a second time to obtain
Lnf (G, s0, T gmc) ≥ Lnf (G, sL, T gmc) . (35)
The left-hand side of (35) is simply the un-tolled total latency
on G, so combining inequalitites (34) and (35), we obtain
Lnf(G, ∅) ≥ Lnf (G, s, T gmc) . (36)
Since G and s were arbitrary, this implies that tolls of the form
in (15) have a perversity index of 1 on Gp. Finally, Lemma 1.1
shows that these tolls are necessary as well.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let β(s, (κ1, κ2)) := κ2s1+κ1s . The con-
straints on κ1, κ2 specified in Theorem 2 imply that for all
s ∈ [SL, SU], β(s, (κ1, κ2)) ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma 2.1 implies
that on any G ∈ Gp, worst-case routing is achieved by a
homogeneous population with s = SL. Thus, the price of
anarchy for heterogeneous populations is equal to that given
by Lemma 5.5 for β ≤ 1, proving the theorem.
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Proofs for Theorem 5
In the following, we frequently refer to the quantity
β(s, (κ1, κ2)) :=
κ2s
1 + κ1s
; (37)
since T (κ1, κ2) induces cost functions of (24).
That is, β(s, (κ1, κ2)) indicates users’ induced sensitivity
to their marginal effect on others: when β = 1, users interpret
their marginal latency effect on others correctly. When β < 1,
users are overly delay-sensitive; when β > 1, users are not
delay-sensitive enough. Note that T gmc corresponds to β ≤ 1.
First, we present the following lemma, which is adapted
from [23, Propositions 7.6, 7.7], giving the price of anarchy for
known-sensitivity homogeneous population for fixed κ1, κ2:
Lemma 5.5 (Meir and Parkes, 2015 [23]). Let Gd be the
class of routing problems with polynomial latency functions
of degree no more than d ≥ 1, and let G denote the class of
all routing problems with polynomial latency functions. In the
following, let κ := (κ1, κ2) and let β(s, κ) := κ2s1+κ1s ≥ 0.
Then the price of anarchy resulting from T (κ1, κ2) for a
homogeneous population with sensitivity s is
PoA(Gd, s, κ)=

1
1+dβ(s,κ)−d(1+dβ(s,κ)1+d )
d+1
d
if β(s, κ) ≤ 1,
β(s, κ)−d
(
1+dβ(s,κ)
1+d
)d+1
if β(s, κ) > 1.
(38)
Lemma 5.5 follows from [23, Propositions 7.6, 7.7] for reasons
elucidated in the proof of Lemma 2.1. This allows us to state:
Lemma 5.6. Let Gpd denote the class of routing problems
with parallel networks and polynomial latency functions of
degree no more than d ≥ 1. Given κ2 > 0, when κ1 ∈
(−1/SU, κ2 − 1/SU), the homogeneous perversity index of
T (κ1, κ2) is greater than 1 and equal to the price of anarchy
experienced by a population with sensitivity SU:
PIhm (Gpd , T (κ1, κ2)) = PoA(Gd, SU, (κ1, κ2)) . (39)
Proof of Lemma 5.6: Let β(s) := κ2s1+κ1s . By Lemma 2.1,
the perversity index can never be greater than 1 due to a
population with β(s) ≤ 1. However, β(s) > 1 is increasing
in s whenever κ2 > 0 and κ1 > −1/SU, implying that
the price of anarchy due to a population with β(s) > 1 is
achieved by one with s = SU. To prove the lemma, we show
that there is a perverse flow for s = SU whose perversity
equals the corresponding price of anarchy. Accordingly, let
β := κ2SU1+κ1SU > 1. Consider the network in Figure 3(c) with
r = 1 and α = (β(1+d))
d
(1+dβ)d+1
; this network is borrowed from [23].
The optimal and uninfluenced Nash flow on this network has
f1 = 1, but the tolled Nash flow when s = SU has larger total
latency which achieves the β > 1 PoA bound given in (38),
completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5: The restriction to homogeneous popula-
tions here allows us to apply Lemma 5.5 directly, and leverage
its monotonicity properties to obtain the result. Consider the
expressions given by (38) as a function of β(s, κ). The price of
anarchy as a function of β is bowl-shaped: when β(s, κ) < 1,
the price of anarchy is strictly decreasing in β(s, κ), when
β(s, κ) > 1, the price of anarchy is strictly increasing in
β(s, κ), and when β(s, κ) = 1, the price of anarchy is equal to
1. Thus, minimizing the price of anarchy reduces to choosing
κ1 and κ2 such that for all s ∈ [SL, SU], β(s, κ) takes values
as “close” to 1 as possible, where this closeness is measured
by the expressions in (38). Furthermore, when κ1 > −1/SU
and κ2 ≥ 0, the monotonicity of β(s, κ) ensures that the price
of anarchy is achieved by an extreme sensitivity population
with s ∈ {SL, SU}.
For any fixed κ2 > 0 and fixed s ∈ [SL, SU], β(s, κ)
is decreasing in κ1 whenever κ1 > −1/SU; also, when
κ1 = κ2 − 1/s, we have β(s, κ) = 1 (thus, the PoA
for that s is 1). Combined with the above, this means the
price of anarchy is minimized in κ1 on the interval I :=
(max{−1/SU, κ2 − 1/SL}, κ2 − 1/SU).
Accordingly, for any κ2, let δ := M − κ2. For any κ2 > 0
and κ1 ∈ I , it holds that
β(SL, (κ1, κ2) < β(SL, (κ1 + δ, κ2 + δ)),
and
β(SU, (κ1, κ2) > β(SU, (κ1 + δ, κ2 + δ)).
That is, when κ1 ∈ I , the price of anarchy can be decreased
by adding δ to both κ1 and κ2, showing that κ∗2 = M .
Finally, given that κ∗2 = M and κ1 ∈ I , note
that PoA(Gd, SL, (κ1, κ∗2)) is strictly increasing in κ1,
that PoA(Gd, SU, (κ1, κ∗2)) is strictly decreasing in κ1, and
both are continuous for all κ1. This guarantees that the PoA-
minimizing κ∗1 must lie on the interval (−1/SU,M − 1/SU),
and (19) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.6.
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